Monday, April 25, 2016

Skeptic Belief; Hume Visions


          Travel down the theological argument of belief and you come to a phrase original cause.  How does one begin to have an idea of the root origin of a particular event? How does one know through a complex casual chain what is truly origin?  For myself, I refrain from using dogmatic circles and in lieu place emphasis on probability of the outlier.  Following to model similar to David Hume’s, propositions also remove the failure by contradiction and allow for more openly inclusive understanding rather than unique knowledge.  It would seem then that within discipline of sociology is where we are able pursue connections of belief into a cultural context that allows for moral agency.  It does not discount any pursuant ability to a true root, but leaves area for more suitable understanding down the road when learned. 

            So with the structure of our propositional direction and
with only the sensations of the external objects in question, original causes can never be readily found to better detail terms through reasoning.  As the cause of an idea cannot be the idea itself, external bodies can only impinge upon one and give a representation of itself in memory.  .  Due to also never having the ability of our minds to capsulize nor see an entirety of a particular event, our imagination comes into play to bridge connections out of habited, causal inferences.  We therefore mistakenly see connection of bodily motion as willed but as Hume critiques, only our mind wills an event; it is another event that immediately follows of motion and vice versa.

            If the argument of internal and external knowledge of belief above is valid, philosophers and theologians have failed to acknowledge it and have tried to conceptualize power of will by Maker and the like in terms of chains of reasoning that lead inevitably to extraordinary claims as we can never see the connections between the two due to our limited sensory capabilities.  These intelligent principles of others find themselves washed of thorough true cause as it takes upon it the power of a deity that imbues everything with its will alone, denying moral and object agency.  If avoiding these dogmatic philosophies rightly, then theory of universal energies is far too bold as the grounds of the theory are far too extraordinary for mortal ignorance to comprehend.  Only having felt the connections through habituation, one can only use their imagination to render the connections though never truly have sight of it in any defined sense of the term.  Hume’s perceptions in the weakness of cause and effect thinking calls into question once more of how little we know of the idea itself of necessary connections and its assistance through a being’s own mind and imaginative cognitions.  Though these relationships give a wealth of understanding in their external world about them, it is simply built upon similar instances of experience prior that has built that connection of outcomes and actions.  Therefore, though practically useful, cause and effect relationships are merely “taken-for-granteds” by persons that are habitualized into mental routine.
            So if this is the total of our abilities to perceive intrusions upon ourselves, what do we really know from faulty cause and effect or blind faith to false true causes? The only true causes found is that they have yet to be discovered from behind their veil of mystery.  Without any divine knowledge bestowed, and if so done against laws of nature and perfect being understanding, there seems little reason to place so much “belief” upon anything other than what I can properly determine in my finite understanding.  Sometimes they may warrant across extraordinary claims that fall well short of origin causes, like my lucky dollar bill, but for the most part they adhere to objective probability that falls in line with faulty cause and effect.  Though not the best by any means, I at least know the limits and try to pursue a deeper knowledge beyond that to which I currently know and do not fail to rise to meet the challenge of looking for more detailed origin causes.

Sunday, April 24, 2016

Belief: Is it Really What We Think?


               As with any conversation amid dogmatic roots, opinion and belief take front stage as standpoints of truth.  Taking Baggini’s useful Nessie argument, belief is pivotal in any conception, theist or non-subscriber. However, beliefs are taken to be built upon circular argument or epistemic with belief taken as true knowledge, otherwise known as skepticism.  Therefore it would seem to follow that belief is nothing more than a different aspect of an individual life and not always, if at all, given by a higher power.  Theist or non-theist, beliefs are the story between the lines.  Coupled with moral agency and free choice only limited to contextual constraints, these items are the factors in question that define how someone’s option of faith becomes just that, an option and not special knowledge in detailing one’s character.  Like any social movement, the Nessie beliefs are transferred, distorted, reimagined into modernity and form a new common held belief.  Socialization, enculturation, and indoctrination then take over the deciding factors that we as social beings are confined to from day one, not a divine intervention of understanding.  Just as Baggini states, the ability to term and label objects is just a minor arbitration amongst a group when required to mark objects of importance or rather relevance.  So atheistic belief does not attach itself simply to religious prescriptions, it is simply the relevance of free will/free choice and the rate to which a being has moral bearing within themselves.  Clearly, belief isn’t enough; Kirkegardian moral agency of free will comes into construction of beliefs and both too can be tools used in either fashion, theist or non, depending upon the unique perspective of the individual’s character.

                Taking yet another example of another philosopher who tackled with belief, Albert Camus’s “The Stranger” has at the heart a protagonist, Meursault, who is eventually locked into prison for murder and unlocking his self-awareness.  Nearing his day with the guillotine, he is confronted with a priest who he wishes nothing to do with or his words of his God. Having already pondering the facts of everyone eventually dying and salvation by appeal through self-analysis, not faith, the interaction between the characters falls victim to common belief structures held between two individuals. As Meursault affirms his personal denials of the existence of the divine, the chaplain determines he has been in despair and like all others who have come before he must turn to God in the end.  Though Camu’s protagonist believes this only leads to false hope over death and denial of personal belief, the chaplain sees his denial as despair and avoiding the divine truth.  Both with their beliefs in hand, impasse sets in between a theist and non-believer; the end result of the common social interaction of differences.
                Fiction it may be, the example holds true as a typical exchange most are all too familiar with.  However, both examples of Nessies and Meursault one object we often look over is how we are actually conceiving the multitude of our beliefs via terms in our limited sensory state.  How are we building these terms in exchange amongst each other and what do we build these terms upon in order to believe in them, theist or not?